Recommendation: The issue was fixed in DnsMasq software version 2. To solve the vulnerability on your device, apply the firmware or system update that contains DnsMasq software version 2.
If an update addressing the vulnerability is not yet available for your device, you can secure your router or Wi-Fi hotspot with a strong password to minimize risks imposed by the vulnerability. We also advise you not to visit suspicious websites or run software from questionable sources I just can't imagine on such a newer top of the line router by linksys having this issue and I am the only one on planet earth that knows about it and can't get any yes or no direct answers!
I sure don't want to get stuck in a back and forth with linksys saying there is nothing wrong with my router and avast saying oh yes there is something wrong with your router. Thank you in advance! Not sure what type of help you require here. Detections are valid. Up to you what you do about them. Linksys is saying there is nothing wrong with my router and it is a false positive!
Avast is saying their the detection is real and not a false positive! The issue was fixed in DnsMasq software version 2. This detection is based on DNS version obtained via remote finteprint also called banner detection.
Banner detections are not critical in this particular case is detection verbosity set to warning , it says your device is likely vulnerable. We are not sending real exploit probes to detect vulnerable DNS servers, because its too dangerous and it may cause the application crash.
Win 8. IBC [UI. Perhaps a more recent package in the beta. Armbian enables unattended-upgrades, all the vulnerabilities that were disclosed on 2nd Oct had been backported to Xenial's 2. CVE doesn't show in the changelog for the package though but that's not an Armbian thing at all, purely Ubuntu - and I'm not being ironic. Anyway: other than fixing a potential configuration error with unattended-upgrades we can't do much here anyway since for obvious reasons we rely on upstream distro security fixes.
Active threads Mark site read. Share More sharing options Start new topic. Recommended Posts. Posted November 5, When getting a reply from a forwarded query, dnsmasq checks in forward. Due to the weak hash CRC32 when dnsmasq is compiled without DNSSEC, SHA-1 when it is this flaw allows an off-path attacker to find several different domains all having the same hash, substantially reducing the number of attempts they would have to perform to forge a reply and get it accepted by dnsmasq.
This is in contrast with RFC, which specifies that the query name is one of the attributes of a query that must be used to match a reply. If chained with CVE the attack complexity of a successful attack is reduced. When getting a reply from a forwarded query, dnsmasq checks in the forward. This issue contrasts with RFC, which specifies a query's attributes that all must be used to match a reply.
A remote attacker, who can create valid DNS replies, could use this flaw to cause an overflow in a heap-allocated memory. A flaw was found in dnsmasq before 2. An attacker on the network, who can create valid DNS replies, could use this flaw to cause an overflow with arbitrary data in a heap-allocated memory, possibly executing code on the machine.
The flaw is in the rfc The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity as well as system availability. An attacker on the network, who can forge DNS replies such as that they are accepted as valid, could use this flaw to cause a buffer overflow with arbitrary data in a heap memory segment, possibly executing code on the machine.
A vulnerability was found in dnsmasq before version 2. Improper bounds checking in Dnsmasq before 2.
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